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The Labyrinth of Solidarity: Why the Future
of the American Labor Movement Depends
on Latino Workers*
CHRISTOPHER DAVID Ruiz CAMERONt
Modem man never surrenders himself to what he is doing.
A part of him - the profoundest part - always remains detached
and alert.
- Octavio Paz1
INTRODUCTION
When a strike by 185,000 sorters, loaders, and drivers shut down
the nationwide operations of United Parcel Service during the summer
of 1997,2 I received inquiries from a number of news organizations
whose reporters inevitably posed the same two questions: (1) how long
is the strike going to last, and (2) does the union's victory signal the
resurgence of the American labor movement?
I hesitated to answer these questions, but for different reasons.
The first question, which did not fall within my expertise as a labor
law professor, was both timely and of great practical importance.
Unfortunately, not even the combatants can accurately predict when a
given labor dispute will end. Eventually, UPS would take two weeks to
agree to the Teamsters' settlement terms before regular deliveries
resumed.
The second question, which did fall within my expertise, was
superficially appealing but ultimately beside the point. Every industry,
* Copyright © 1999.
t Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Irving D. and Florence Rosenberg Professor of
Law, Southwestern University School of Law, Los Angeles. A.B. 1980 University of California,
Los Angeles; J.D. 1983 Harvard Law School. My thanks to Kevin Johnson, George Martfnez, and
Mary Romero, who encouraged my early attempts to summarize the ideas presented here. Thanks
also to Keith Aoki, Roberto Corrada, Berta Herndndez, and Eric Yamamoto, who offered
thoughtful comments at the Third Annual Latino/a Critical Theory Conference in Miami. This
project was made possible by the generous support of the Trustees of Southwestern University
School of Law. Valuable research assistance was provided by Matthias Wagener (Class of 1999).
This paper is dedicated to the memory of Francisco Xavier Ruiz, the first union organizer I ever
knew.
1. OCrAVIO PAZ, THE LABYRINTH OF SOLITUDE 204 (Grove Weidenfield ed., 1985, trans.
Lysander Kemp).
2. See, e.g., Karen Kaplan, Teamsters Strike UPS, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1997, at A-1.
3. See, e.g., Jube Shiver, Jr., UPS, Teamsters Reach Accord, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1997, at
A-I.
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every employer, and every workforce is different; it is all but impossible
to draw any meaningful conclusions about whether and how the resolu-
tion of particular grievances in a single confrontation will affect labor
relations generally.4 What's truly important in a labor dispute, I
thought, is who the parties are, and what resources they bring to the
battle. Is the labor movement is back? A better question would be,
who's backing the labor movement?
Today, in more American workplaces than ever before, the answer
to my question is the same: women and men of Latin origin. While
organized labor as a whole is desperately struggling to avoid becoming
irrelevant,5 Latino workers as a group are enjoying unprecedented suc-
cesses in forming new labor organizations, breathing life into old unions,
and winning generous contracts. Largely overlooked during the UPS
labor dispute was the fact that so much of the company's workforce,
especially in the big cities of the Southwest, consists of Latinos.' In
Southern California alone, at least half of the package delivery giant's
15,000 employees were of Hispanic heritage - a fact that could not be
missed on television. Local news channels broadcast pictures of pickets
at the company's downtown Los Angeles distribution facility, where the
faces of all but a handful of the rank-and-file belonged to brown people.7
When Teamster-represented employees won their key demand -
10,000 more full-time jobs for UPS' heavily part-time workforce8 -
Southern California Latinos were among the primary beneficiaries.
Just a year earlier, in a local precursor to the UPS dispute, Latino
truck drivers represented by the Teamsters had won a smaller-scale, but
equally impressive, victory. The drivers, who eked out a minimum-
wage living delivering fresh tortillas sold in Los Angeles County retail
4. Occasionally, however, a labor dispute is so momentous that it is credited with redefining
labor relations for the generation in which it occurs. During the early 1980s, the mass firing of
striking air traffic controllers by President Ronald Reagan, see, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Labor
Law Reform in a World of Competitive Markets, in MATTHEW FINKIN, THE LEGAL FUTURE OF
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION 13, 19 (1994), and the plunging of Continental Airlines into
bankruptcy by carrier chief Frank Lorenzo, see, e.g., RAY SCIPPA & MYRTLE DAVIDSON MALONE,
POINT TO POINT: THE SIXTY YEAR HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL AIRLINES (1995), fit this bill
because each event ended the long-term careers of thousands of unionized employees.
5. Once a pillar of American industry, labor unions now face irrelevance, if not
extinction. From their peak in the fifties, when they signed up roughly one in three
American workers, unions now represent only one in six. Not counting public
sector employees, the figure is closer to one in 10. If private sector unions continue
to decline at the present rate, they will represent less than 5 percent of the workforce
by 2005.
Sean Reilly, The Case for Unions, WASH. MONTHLY, July/Aug. 1995, at 26.
6. See Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, New Face of American Labor, J. COMM., Aug. 29,
1997, at 8A.
7. See id.
8. Shiver, supra note 3, at A-I.
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food stores under the Mission and Guerrero labels, took on mighty
Gruma Corporation, the U.S. subsidiary of one of Mexico's biggest food
processors. Following an extensive community-based campaign, which
included pledges from prominent Anglo and Latino officials to join a
boycott against the company's products,9 drivers persuaded the company
to sign a new collective bargaining agreement granting substantial pay
and benefit increases.10
Due to a growing, and until now, mostly low-wage Latino
workforce coveted by employers, Southern California has become
"ground zero" for labor organizing during this decade. 1 Since 1990,
three of labor's biggest organizing victories - wherein previously non-
union workers chose union representation and then successfully negoti-
ated a first contract - have been scored among Latinos there: 1,500
foundry workers, who joined the International Association of Machin-
ists, at American Racing, Inc., in Long Beach; 3,000 drywall installers,
who joined the United Brotherhood of Carpenters, in the home construc-
tion industry stretching from Santa Barbara to San Diego; and 1,000
janitors, who joined the Service Employees International Union through
its "Justice for Janitors" campaign, at high-rise office buildings in Cen-
tury City on Los Angeles' Westside.' 2 And this winter saw the addition
of the largest organizing prize in modern labor history: 74,000 low-
wage, government-paid home care workers, who joined the SEIU in Los
Angeles County.' 3
Southern California is also home to some high-profile union
organizing that has yet to bear fruit, at least in the form of new members
or new contracts. Periodically, independent truck drivers working the
internationally-important Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, respec-
9. See, e.g., Dan Weikel, Labor Day Rally Backs Drivers' Strike, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1996,
at B-i (noting that then U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Secretary Henry
Cisneros, U.S. Reps. Esteban Torres and Maxine Waters, California Lt. Gov. Gray Davis, state
Sens. Richard Polanco and Tom Hayden, and L.A. Dist. Atty. Gil Garcetti had each signed such a
pledge).
10. See, e.g., L.A. Union Organizing Project Gets Funding from Teamsters, 1996 DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) No. 190, at D-I1 (Oct. 1, 1996); see also Nancy Rivera Brooks, Hard Pressed:
Truckers' Strike Has Some Areas Low on Tortillas, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1996, at D-I (detailing
effects of Teamsters' strike against Gruma Corp.).
11. Multi-Union Organizing Effort in Los Angeles Aims at Immigrant Workers, 1995 DAILY
LAB. REr. (BNA) No. 166, at A-5 (Aug. 28, 1995) (remarks of AFL-CIO California Immigrant
Workers' Association Organizer Joel Ochoa).
12. See, e.g., Los ANGELES MANUFACTURING ORGANIZING PROJECT, ORGANIZING THE
FUTURE 2 (July 20, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter LA MAP, ORGANIZING THE FUTURE];
Mary Helen Berg, Labor Leaders Aim Efforts at Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, City Times, Oct. 30,
1994, at 1, 19.
13. See, e.g., Nancy Cleeland, Home Care Workers Vote for Union a Landmark for Labor,
L.A TIMES, Feb. 26, 1999, at A-I; Tom Gilroy, Los Angeles Home Care Workers Vote for Service
Employees, Union Announces, 1999 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 38, at AA-I (Feb. 26, 1999).
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tively, have staged wildcat strikes in support of their demands to join the
Communication Workers of America.' 4 Porters and chambermaids at
the New Otani Hotel in Los Angeles' Little Tokyo - a lodging fre-
quented by Asian business travelers - continue to make claims, before
both the National Labor Relations Board and the international court of
public opinion, in support of their demand to be represented by the Hotel
Employees and Restaurant Employees Union. 15 Even gardeners who
maintain the yards of well-to-do neighborhoods have captured public
attention through a campaign opposing local ordinances that ban the use
of their ubiquitous gas-powered leaf-blowers, a cause championed by
the Association of Latin American Gardeners of Los Angeles.' 6
Southern California, however, is not the only place where Latinos
are forming and joining labor unions. Since 1990, over 20,000 mostly
Hispanic immigrant workers have walked off their jobs, or participated
in organizing campaigns, across the country. 17 Mexican and Central
American culinary workers in Las Vegas, 8 Guatemalan and Salvadoran
custodians in Maryland,19 Mexican poultry processors in Missouri, 20 and
Dominican and Puerto Rican health care workers in New York2' are
among the growing ranks of Latinos who are demanding the chance to
14. See, e.g., Stuart Silverstein, Undaunted by Setbacks, Truckers Look to Union, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 1997, at A-1 [hereinafter Silverstein, Undaunted]; Jeff Leeds, What's Up, Dock?
Trucking Dispute Prompts Changes at Local Ports, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1996, at D-1; Stuart
Silverstein & Jeff Leeds, Independent Truckers, Union Form a Convoy, L.A. TIMES, May 11,
1996, at D-I.
15. See, e.g., Tom Gilroy, AL Rules in Favor of New Otani Hotel in Long-Running Fight
with HERE Local, 1997 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 157, at D-13 (Aug. 14, 1997); International
Group Calls for Boycott of New Otani Hotels, 1997 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 129, at D13
(July 7, 1997); Harry Bernstein, Hotel Needs to Deal Straight with Workers, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 19,
1996, at B-9.
16. See, e.g., Jill Leovy, Leaf Blower Ban Takes Effect Today, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1998, at
B-I; Bettina Boxall, Leaf Blower Issue a Clash of Expectations, Realities, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11,
1998, at A-1.
17. See, e.g., David Bacon, Unions and the Upsurge of Immigrant Workers,
dbacon@igc.apc.org (Dec. 3, 1997) (on-line labor column).
18. See, e.g., Marc Cooper, Labor Deals a New Hand, NATION, Mar. 24, 1997, at 11-12
(remarks of AFL-CIO President John Sweeney) (describing Las Vegas as "the hottest union city
in America") [hereinafter Cooper, Labor Deals].
19. See, e.g., Scott Wilson, Hispanic Community Supports Custodians in Labor Dispute,
WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1997, at B-5 (describing union drive by II maintenance workers at 590-unit
apartment complex in Prince George's County as response to employer's having both made them
clean sewers without protective gear and failed to grant pay raise in at least 2 years).
20. See, e.g., Bill Lambrecht, Influx of Hispanic Workers Alters Culture of Small
Southwestern Missouri Towns, ST. Lou. POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 28, 1997, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Slpd File (estimating 60% to 65% of workforce at 2 Hudson Foods, Inc., plants in
Noel, Mo., to consist of recent Mexican immigrants).
21. See, e.g., Sam Roberts, A New Face for American Labor, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 10,
1992, at 15 (profiling Dennis Rivera, head of Local 1199 of Drug, Hospital and Health Care
Employees Union).
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bargain for better wages and working conditions. Their appearance on
the national scene is hardly surprising; by the middle of the next decade,
Latinos are expected to become the largest non-White segment of the
American workforce.22
This essay makes the case that the future of the American labor
movement will depend on its ability to harness Latino organizing power.
I address the subject in three parts. Part I traces Latinization of the U.S.
workforce. Part II discusses what Latinos have to gain from unionism,
and what unionism has to gain from Latinos. Finally, Part III summa-
rizes the challenges that a Latino-led labor resurgence faces, and how
successfully meeting these challenges can benefit workers of all races.
I. THE LATINIZATION OF THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE
The 1990s could be remembered as the decade in which the "sal-
sification" of the American diet was completed.23 Since 1991, com-
bined yearly sales of salsa and picante sauce have outstripped those of
the all-American flavor-enhancer, ketchup. After climbing at an annual
rate of eight to 12 percent, retail salsa and picante sales reached $940
million in 1994 and are projected to top $1.5 billion in 1999. The mete-
oric growth of salsa and picante sales tracks the retail sales record of
Mexican food in general, which reached $2.4 billion in 1994, and is
projected to top $3.4 billion in 1999.24
Why is salsa beating ketchup? Certainly, it's not because salsa is
something new; chiles and herbs native to the New World, salsa's key
ingredients, have been centuries-long staples in the diets of many people
who trace their roots to Mexico, the Caribbean, and South America.25
Although the reasons for salsa's success are probably complex, observ-
ers are tempted to reach for pat answers. According to the president of a
food marketing firm quoted in one acclaimed cook book, the key factor
(besides the burgeoning presence of Latinos on the U.S. side of the Latin
American border) is the perception that Mexican food, unlike French or
Japanese cuisine, is "idiot-proof. '26 He added: "Mexican food is pretty
tasty, no matter what you do to it."27
22. See, e.g., Howard Fullerton, Labor Force 2006: Slowing Down and Changing
Composition, summarized in 1997 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 233, at D-24 (Dec. 4, 1997)
(excerpting Bureau of Labor Statistics' November 1997 Monthly Labor Review) (projecting
Hispanics to become second-largest racial group in workforce by 2006); Hispanic Workers Could
Soon Outnumber Blacks, 156 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 501 (Dec. 12, 1997) (same).
23. VICTOR M. VALLE & MARY LAU VALLE, RECIPE OF MEMORY: FIVE GENERATIONS OF
MEXICAN CUISINE 172, 175 (1995).
24. See id. at 172.
25. See id. at 41-42.
26. See id. at 173.
27. See id.
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Of course, not all Latinos are Mexicans, and not all Mexican food
is "idiot-proof."28 But the marketing president's simplistic understand-
ing of salsa's popularity should caution us to avoid some common mis-
perceptions held by non-Hispanics about Latino workers - for
example, that Latinos are "new" to the U.S.; that the terms "Latino" and
"Mexican" are synonymous, referring mainly to the farm workers whose
cause was taken up by the late Cesar Chavez in California; or that Lati-
nos will remain loyal workers, "no matter what you do to [them]."
Nevertheless, if the 1990s are remembered for the "salsification" of
the American diet, then the 2000s will be remembered for the "Latiniza-
tion" of the American workforce - even though Latino workers have
toiled in the United States for a long time.
Since 1848, when the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ended the Mex-
ican-American War, turned half of Mexico into the Southwestern United
States, and transformed some 120,000 Mexicans into Mexican-Ameri-
cans, Latino workers have played vital roles in the U.S. economy. 29 Ini-
tially, these first U.S. Latinos worked in copper mines and steel mills,
and on farms and ranches; eventually, they worked in oil fields, garment
sweatshops, and tire factories, on loading docks and auto assembly lines,
and in restaurants, hotels, offices, and stores.30 They were, and are, both
native-born and immigrant, documented and undocumented. Employers
prized Mexicanos, like many Latinos after them, "because we can treat
them as we cannot treat any other living man."'" And not infrequently,
Latinos responded to the severe discrimination that they faced by form-
ing and joining labor unions.32
28. See, e.g., LAURA ESQUIVEL, LIKE WATER FOR CHOCOLATE 45-46, 49-50, 52-53 (Carol
Christensen & Thomas Christensen trans., 1992) (sharing complex recipe for quail in rose petal
sauce).
29. See, e.g., JUAN GOMEZ-QUIlrONES, MEXICAN AMERICAN LABOR: 1790-1990 39 (1994);
RODOLFo F. ACUR A, OCCUPIED AMERICA: A HISTORY OF CHICANOS 141 (3d ed. 1988);
Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, "Friends" or "Enemies"? The Status of Mexicans and
Mexican-Americans in the United States on the Sesquicentennial of the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo,_5 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 5, 13 (1998).
30. See G6MEz-QUI&ONES, supra note 29, at 3.
31. We want the Mexicans because we can treat them as we cannot treat any other
living man. We can control them at night behind bolted gates, within a stockade
eight feet high, surrounded by barbed wire. We make them work under armed
guards in the fields.
G6MEZ-QUIIqONES, supra note 29, at 3 (quoting agricultural employer) (citation omitted).
32. See, e.g., G6MEz-QUIrnONES, supra note 29, passim. A rich literature documents the place
of Latino workers, especially Mexicanos, in the U.S. economy. For examples focusing on
agricultural workers, see, e.g., MARK REISLER, BY THE SWEAT OF THEIR BROW: MEXICAN
IMMIGRANT LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900-1940 (1976); CAREY MCWILLIAMS, FACTORIES
IN THE FIELDS (1939); Dennis Nodfn Valdds, Betabeleros: The Formation of an Agricultural
Proletariat in the Midwest, 1897-1930, 30 LAB. HIST. 536 (1989). For an example focusing on
domestic workers, see MARY ROMERO, MAID IN THE USA (1994).
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Indeed, the only thing truly "new" about Latino workers in the
United States today is their sheer number.33 In 1980, the U.S. Census
reported that the civilian workforce totaled 106.1 million people, of
which 85.2 percent were White, 10.2 percent were Black, 5.7 percent
were Hispanic, and 2.6 percent were Asian or Pacific Islander.34 But by
1990, the civilian labor force numbered 125.2 million people, of which
82.1 percent were White, 10.7 percent were Black, 8.1 percent were His-
panic, and 2.9 percent were Asian or Pacific Islander.15 As Table 1 indi-
cates, the number of Latinos working in the U.S. grew by 75.4 percent
from 1980 to 1990, making them the fastest-growing segment of the
American workforce:
TABLE 136 GROWTH OF U.S. LABOR FORCE 1980-1990 (By RACE)
160, 1
140
I 9f
C -U
.2 100
804 -
0 ----- All Races
40 
- W-White
20 -i-,- Hispanic
Sk----Bak
Year
Source: Statistical Abstract of the Unitd States 1gg"
Moreover, according to the Statistical Abstract of the United States,
Latinois made up 9.3 percent of the civilian workforce in 1995, and are
33. Of course, Latino workers are not a homogeneous group. In 1980, the Census Bureau
reported that the Hispanic workforce consisted of 6.1 million people, of which 57.4% were
Mexican, 11.8% were Puerto Rican, 6.5% were Cuban, and 22.9% were "other" Hispanics. In
1990, the Hispanic workforce consisted of 10.1 million people, of which 59.4% were Mexican,
10.9% were Puerto Rican, 5.9% were Cuban, and 24.8% were "other" Hispanics. See MA-17HIAS
H. WAOENER, SURVEY OF U.S. HISPANIC LABOR 17 (Aug. 1997) (compiled from U.S. Census
Bureau, U.S. Statistical Abstract, and California Census of Population data) (on file with author)
[hereinafter SURVEY OF U.S. HISPANIC LABOR].
In fact, the broad coverage of the term "Hispanic" explains why in both text and tables my
percentages of workers, as identified by race, add up to more than 100%. In relying on data
compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau, I am compelled to rely also the Bureau's definition of the
term "Hispanic," which refers to individuals of Latin origin of any race. This means, for example,
that an individual who is both Black and Puerto Rican would be counted twice: once as "Black,"
plus once as "Hispanic."
34. See SURVEY OF U.S. HisPANc LABOR, supra note 33, at 15.
35. See id. at 14.
36. See id. at 66 (graph).
p
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projected to reach 11.1 percent in 2005.37 As Table 1 also indicates,
sometime during the middle of the next decade, as one in nine U.S.
workers becomes Hispanic, Latinos will surpass African Americans as
the country's second largest racial and ethnic working group.
Nowhere are Hispanic workers more important to the economy
than in Los Angeles County, which serves as Southern California's eco-
nomic engine. In 1980, the California Census of Population reported
that Los Angeles County's civilian workforce consisted of 3.7 million
people, of which 71.2 percent were White, 24.5 percent were Hispanic,
11.1 percent were Black, and 6.4 percent were Asian or Pacific
Islander. 38 By 1990, the County's labor force reached 4.6 million peo-
ple, of which 59.6 percent were White, 34.5 percent were Hispanic, 10.8
percent were Asian or Pacific Islander, and 10.1 percent were Black.3 9
As Table 2 indicates, Latino labor grew at a rate of 73.4 percent during
the decade, a substantial increase that was surpassed only by Asians and
Pacific Islanders, whose whopping 107.3 percent gain reflected their
comparatively small absolute numbers:
TABLE 240 GROWTH OF L.A. COUNTY LABOR FORCE 1980-1990
(By RACE)
3000
--------------------------
2500
2000
0
1500
z 1000
500 
---- Asians & Pacific Islanders
- White
- Hispanic
1980 1990 - -Black
Year
Sou- 1990 California Cen.us of Population
Although Hispanic workers are found in a wide range of jobs
throughout the County, they are highly concentrated in the area's vital
manufacturing sector 4' - a fact that places them in the driver's seat of
one of North America's most important economic vehicles.
37. See id. at 66-67 (compiled from U.S. Statistical Abstract data).
38. See id. at 55 (compiled from California Census of Population data).
39. See id. at 54-55 (compiled from California Census of Population data).
40. See id. (construct graph from bar charts).
41. See Los ANGELES MANUFACTURING ACTION PROJECT, MANUFACTURING IN Los ANGELES:
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For all of Los Angeles' importance as America's entertainment
capital, a" the region is even more important as the country's manufactur-
ing capital.43 Manufacturing is still critical to the area's economic well-
being, and is still growing, despite the continued downsizing of South-
ern California's once-vaunted aerospace and defense industries. This
unheralded manufacturing sector consists of two components: the
highly-visible "durable goods" portion, in which transportation equip-
ment, aerospace and defense instruments, fabricated metal products,
machinery, electronic goods, furniture, metals, stone and glass, and lum-
ber products are produced;" and the less-visible "non-durable" goods
sector, in which apparel, printing, food products, rubber and plastics,
chemicals, paper, textiles, petroleum, and leather are made.45 The con-
trast between the durable and non-durable goods components can be
seen in the industries affected by some of the labor disputes recounted
above: under the heading "fabricated metal products," the durable goods
sector took center stage when foundry workers organized a union at
American Racing Equipment; under the heading "food products," the
non-durable goods sector came to the fore when truck drivers delivering
Mission- and Guerrero-label tortillas took on Gruma Corp.
Not surprisingly, immigrant Latinos hold down half of Los Angeles
County's estimated 700,000 manufacturing jobs46 - a figure that gives
the region roughly 50 percent more manufacturing positions than its
nearest rival, Chicago-Cook County, Ill.47 And half of these manufac-
turing jobs are geographically concentrated along the so-called "Ala-
meda Corridor," a 20-mile strip linking a vast district of production and
distribution facilities located to the northeast of downtown with the
Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach located to the south.4 8 About
300,000 new manufacturing jobs are expected to be created there during
the next decade, and Latinos are expected to fill most of these too.4 9
This expansion will be fueled by three enormous regional construction
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ORGANIZING 14-15, 18 (June 24, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter LA
MAP, ORGANIZING OPPORTUNITIES].
42. For example, whereas in 1993 the motion picture industry accounted for 3% of all jobs in
Los Angeles County, the manufacturing sector accounted for 19% of all such jobs. See LA MAP,
ORGANIZING OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 41, at 6.
43. See LA MAP, ORGANIZING OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 41, at 4-5; LA MAP, ORGANIZING
THE FUTURE, supra note 12, at 2; see also, e.g., Berg, supra note 12, at 19 (describing Los Angeles
County as "industrial heartland" of U.S.).
44. See LA MAP, ORGANIZING OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 41, at 12.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 15, 18; LA MAP, ORGANIZING THE FUTURE, supra note 12, at 2.
47. See LA MAP, ORGANIZING OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 41, at 5.
48. See Berg, supra note 12, at 1; James Flanigan, Remaking L.A. into the New City of Big
Shoulders, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1995, at D-l.
49. See Forecast Predicts Manufacturing Jobs in Los Angeles Area Topping 1 Million Mark,
109719991
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projects: a $8 to $12 billion plan to increase the capacity of Los Angeles
International Airport; a $1.9 billion plan to connect the manufacturing
district to the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach by building a high-
speed, subterranean commercial rail line in the Alameda Corridor; and a
$650 million plan to overhaul Los Angeles Harbor.50
In sum, Latino workers, long important to the U.S. economy, are
quickly becoming essential to it. Having established this, I now turn to
the proposition that, if the workforce of America's future has a brown
face, then the American labor movement of the future (if it has one)
must have the same.
II. WHY ORGANIZED LABOR AND LATINO WORKERS
NEED EACH OTHER
A. What Organized Labor Can Do for Latino Workers
As Professor Juan G6mez-Quifiones has noted, Latino workers,
beginning with Mexicans in what is now the Southwestern U.S., have
toiled in North America since before the establishment of the United
States.' Although, until recently, labor historians have paid little atten-
tion to this community, "few southwestern U.S. capitalists have ignored
Mexican resources or the Mexicano laborer. Indeed, when the hours
were long and the pay short, business interests explicitly sought out
Mexicanos."52
Unfortunately, for too many Latinos, the hours are still long and the
pay is still short.
For the past three decades, although the U.S. median annual house-
hold income earned by Latinos has surpassed that earned by African
Americans, it has consistently fallen short of the income earned by
Whites. In 1980, Hispanic households earned 76.3 percent of what
White households did;53 in 1990, the figure was slightly higher at 76.8
percent.54 The pattern persisted at the local level, including Los Angeles
County. In 1980, Hispanic households there earned 76.9 percent of what
1997 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 124, at D-20 (June 27, 1997) (reporting prediction that
manufacturing employment in 5-county Southern California area will reach 1,075,700 by 2000).
50. See, e.g., Jim Newton, 3 Huge Projects Could Define 21st Century L.A., L.A. TIMES, Dec.
14, 1997, at A- 1, A-44.
51. See G6MEZ-QUIJONEZ, supra note 29, at 3.
52. Id.; see also RODOLFO F. AcuF4A, ANYTHING BUT MEXICAN: CHICANOS IN
CONTEMPORARY Los ANGELES 109 (1996) ("What many Euroamericans regarded as the 'Great
American Desert' was thus transformed by Mexican labor although Euroamericans remember
only the role played by North American irrigation and drainage technology").
53. See SURVEY OF U.S. HISPANIC LABOR, supra note 33, at 20.
54. See id. at 19.
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Whites earned;55 in 1990, the figure dipped to 70.9 percent. 56 Undercut-
ting this decline further was a one-two punch that the Census Bureau's
1990 figures were collected too early to detect: the end of the Cold War,
and the consequent elimination of about half of Southern California's
400,000 aerospace and defense jobs;5 7 and the Los Angeles civil distur-
bances of spring 1992, which drove capital out of the County's industrial
heartland.58 These events seriously damaged the durable-goods compo-
nent of the region's manufacturing sector, where, as noted above,
roughly half of the workers are Latinos.
Following the 1992 civil disturbances, a group of seasoned aca-
demic and labor leaders worried that, if nothing were done to improve
the economic position of immigrant Latinos, a "permanent underclass"
of Latinos would be created. 59 Among other things, these leaders found
that, in communities of Los Angeles County having a poverty level of
20 percent or higher, over 15,000 manufacturing firms were generating
annual revenues of over $54 billion, due largely to the low-wage labor
of 357,000 Latino employees.60 Could anything be done to help Latino
workers share more equitably in this ample wealth, and thereby raise
themselves out of poverty and into a social and political stake in their
communities?
The answer, according to these academics and labor leaders, was to
undertake a major "economic upgrading" of Latino household income.6'
In 1995, they christened their initiative "LA MAP," or the Los Angeles
Manufacturing Action Project. By combining the organizing talents and
resources of 15 separate labor organizations, researchers in UCLA's
Department of Urban Planning and its Center for Labor Research and
Education, and other community groups, LA MAP hoped to raise $3
million and coordinate the organization of up to 717,000 mostly Latino
immigrant workers.62 According to a mission statement published by
LA MAP:
Economic and social stability can be achieved in L.A.'s immigrant
55. See id. at 58.
56. See id. at 57.
57. See, e.g., LA MAP, ORGANIZING OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 41, at 9-11; Elizabeth
Douglass, Northrop to Lay Off2,700 in Downsizing, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1998, at A-I, A-15.
58. See Berg, supra note 12, at 19.
59. See id. (remarks of then-AFL-CIO Regional Director and LA MAP Co-Founder David
Sickler).
60. See LA MAP, ORGANIZING THE FUTURE, supra note 12, at 2.
61. LA MAP, ORGANIZING OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 41, at 30.
62. See id. at 29-30; LA MAP, ORGANIZING THE FUTURE, supra note 12, at 4-5. See also
Organizing Effort Aims at Immigrant Workers, 150 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 24, 24 (Sept. 4, 1995)
(describing Alameda Corridor as "ground zero" for organizing immigrant Latinos who make up
most of corridor's 300,000 manufacturing employees) [hereinafter Organizing Effort].
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communities by increasing manufacturing wages and offering a selec-
tion of comprehensive employer financed benefits, including family
health insurance. This economic upgrading can be accomplished with-
out destroying the competitiveness of the Los Angeles manufacturing
complex. Unionization helps workers achieve economic upgrading and
a voice in their workplace and their communities.63
Would LA MAP's plan to spread the gospel of unionism to Latino
workers actually improve their economic fortunes? The overwhelming
empirical evidence is that it would.
For the past quarter century, labor economists representing a range
of conservative to liberal economic philosophies have published a rich
scientific literature documenting a positive, statistically significant rela-
tionship between the extent of unionization and employees' wages. Put
more simply, the earnings of employees working for union firms are
significantly higher than the wages of employees working for their non-
union competition.64
Some comparisons of the wages earned by non-union and union
workers will illustrate the magnitude of this wage gap. In 1986, the U.S.
median weekly earnings of the typical non-union worker were $325; by
contrast, the weekly earnings of the typical union worker were $439.65
By 1996, the median weekly earnings of the non-union worker had
grown to $462; by contrast, the weekly earnings of the union worker had
grown to $610.66 This wage gap, which is now about 32 percent, 67 has
not only held firmly but also widened steadily. As Table 3 indicates,
during the ten-year period from 1986 to 1996, the typical non-union
employee could expect to find about $110 to $150 less in her weekly
paycheck than her union counterpart:
63. LA MAP, ORGANIZING OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 41, at 29-30.
64. See Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, The Wages of Syntax: Why the Cost of Organizing
a Union Firm's Non-Union Competition Should Be Charged to "Financial Core" Employees, 47
CATH. U.L. REV. 979, 983-84, 993-96 (1998) [hereinafter Cameron, Wages of Syntax].
65. See SURVEY OF U.S. HISPANIC LABOR, supra note 33, at 9.
66. See id.
67. Although the survey data show the wages of union workers, across all races, to be 32%
greater than those of non-union workers, this figure, like the others reported here, does not
necessarily mean that unionization is the sole cause of the gap; other variables associated with
unionization are also responsible. According to labor economists, the extent of union density does
cause higher wages, but the actual differential varies depending upon the particular industry and
geographical area. See Cameron, Wages of Syntax, supra note 64, at 997-99.
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TABLE 368 UNION VS. NON-UNION MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS GAP
1986-1996 (ALL RACES)
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When analyzed by race, the union wage gap becomes even more
pronounced. For example, in 1996, the U.S. median weekly earnings of
the typical non-union worker were, for Whites, $480; for Blacks, $356;
and for Hispanics, $3 19. 6 But in the same year the median weekly
earnings of the typical union worker were, for Whites, $630; for Blacks,
$502; and for Hispanics, $482.70 As Table 4 indicates, although the
wage gap between non-union and union workers in each race category
was huge, it was by far the widest for Hispanics:
68. See SURVEY OF U.S. HISPANIC LABOR, supra note 33, at 9 (graph).
69. See id. at 7.
70. See id. at 6.
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TABLE 471 UNION VS. NON-UNION MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS GAP
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From a strictly economic viewpoint, then, every worker (especially
the worker of color) realizes tremendous benefits from unionization, but
none more than the Latino worker. Whereas union Whites and Blacks
earned 31.3 percent and 41.0 percent, respectively, more than their non-
union counterparts, union Hispanics earned a whopping 51.1 percent
more than non-union Hispanics. 72 As Table 5 indicates, during the ten-
year period from 1986 to 1996, union Latinos consistently benefitted
from a wage gap in the 50 percent range:
TABLE 573 UNION VS. NON-UNION MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS GAP By
PERCENT, 1986-1996 (HISPANICS)
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Of course, at $482, even a 50 percent boost in the weekly paycheck
II (graph).
II.
10 (graph).
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of the typical Hispanic worker isn't going to make her rich; in fact, it's
only $2 more than the weekly paycheck of the typical non-union White
worker. But given a choice, who wouldn't rather make an extra $163
per week?
In sum, no group of workers has more to gain from the labor move-
ment than Latino workers. By any measure, the tangible economic ben-
efits for individual workers, their families, and their communities would
be substantial.
B. What Latino Workers Can Do for Organized Labor
After peaking at 38 percent in 1954, private sector, non-agricultural
union density - the percentage of workers represented by labor unions
- fell to 13 percent in 1993 and is barely 10 percent today. 4 Although
during the past three years the AFL-CIO has spent millions of dollars
and launched a number of high-profile organizing initiatives designed to
turn these numbers around,75 it may be some time before any measura-
ble improvement occurs.7 6 Part of the problem is that changing the cul-
ture of any established institution is enormously difficult. For years,
labor suffered from a "bunker" mentality; it was too afraid of losing
ground to attempt to gain any. "They're all wearing the same uniform,
all reciting the right passages from the prayer book," says a union repre-
sentative familiar with the rhetoric of new organizing efforts in Boston.
"But absolutely nothing has changed. They're the walking dead."77
Against the backdrop of somnambulance projected by so much of
the mainstream labor movement, however, the Latino labor movement is
projecting dynamism. Paced by major organizing victories in Southern
California, over 20,000 mostly immigrant Latinos have walked off their
jobs or participated in other organizing activities across the country
since 1990.78 Their efforts are producing new adherents, more job
security, and better pay and benefits. How are they managing to do it?
74. See Cameron, Wages of Syntax, supra note 64, at 980 (citations omitted).
75. See id. at 979 (citations omitted).
76. As one organizer has put it, "These things are very slow to turn around, like an ocean
liner." Cooper, Labor Deals, supra note 18, at 15 (remarks of Communication Workers of
America's chief organizer). To his credit, Sweeney has helped stem the longstanding hemorrhage
of union membership. A year and-a-half into his presidency, unions had gained more than 50,000
members. Id. And in 1998, AFL-CIO unions organized 475,000 new members. Michelle Amber,
AFL-CIO Organized 475,000 in 1998, But Net Gain Only 65,000, Sweeney Says, 1999 DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 33, at A-14 (Feb. 19, 1999). But this good news was tempered by the
continuation of both losses among unionized workers and gains among non-unionized workers,
which produced a net increase gain of just 65,000 new members. Id.
77. Marc Cooper, Labor's Hardest Drive: Organizing a New Politics, NATION, Nov. 24,
1997, at 16, 18 [hereinafter Cooper, Labor's Hardest Drive] (remarks of unidentified international
union representative).
78. See Bacon, supra note 17.
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At least three types of strategies are responsible for Latinos'
organizing success and ought to be studied. To be sure, the AFL-CIO,
under the leadership of president John Sweeney, has been exploring and
exploiting many of these elements since the mid-1990s, but the value of
considering them systematically should not be underestimated. They
include (1) building organizing efforts from the grass-roots level, but
with the financial and technical support of organized labor; (2) drawing
on the expertise of sympathetic members of the academic community;
and when all else fails, (3) trying assorted remedios caseros, or home
remedies, culled from Latino folk traditions.
1. BoTroM-up ORGANIZING, TOP-DOWN SUPPORT.
In a number of successful cases, Latino workers took the first steps
toward forming or joining unions by organizing from the bottom-up,
rather than by being organized from the top-down. By using what Pro-
fessor Kate Bronfenbrenner of Cornell University calls "union building
tactics," these workers dramatically increased their chances of winning
organizing campaigns.79 At American Racing, Inc., in Long Beach,
Calif., 1,500 Latino and Black foundry workers demanding better pay
and working conditions conducted their own five-day strike in 1990.8o
This happened before organizers from the International Association of
Machinists got involved by helping to consolidate support for the union
and negotiate a first contract. And in the Southern California home
building industry stretching from Santa Barbara to San Diego Counties,
3,000 Mexican drywall hangers all but shut down new home construc-
tion on their own in 1992 and 1993 by walking off the job and by driv-
ing en masse to job sites throughout the region to persuade co-workers
to do the same.8 This happened before the United Brotherhood of
79. See, e.g., Kate Bronfenbrenner, From the Bottom Up: Building Unions and Building
Leaders Through Organizing and First Contract Campaigns iii (Apr. 30-May 2, 1998)
(unpublished executive summary for UCLEA/AFL-CIO Education Conference, San Jose, Calif.)
(reporting average win rates as high as 78% in bargaining units with a majority of workers of
color where 10 or more "union building tactics" were used).
80. See LA MAP, ORGANIZING THE FUTURE, supra note 12, at 2.
81. See, e.g., Bacon, supra note 17. According to labor journalist Bacon:
One of the most important of the immigrant rebellions was the yearlong strike by
southern California drywallers, who put up the interior walls in new homes. In 1992
and (1993), from the Mexican border north to Santa Barbara, an area of 5000 square
miles, these mostly-Mexican immigrants were able to stop all home construction.
Workers ran their movement democratically, from the bottom-up. They defied the
police and the Border Patrol, blockading freeways when their car caravans were
rousted as they traveled to construction sites.
When the drywallers picketed, their lines often numbered in the hundreds,
walking onto construction sites and talking non-strikers into putting down their
tools.
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Carpenters began lending logistical support and helped negotiate a first
contract. These examples stand in contrast to the longstanding approach
of AFL-CIO-affiliated unions, which for decades have tended to target
shops or industries for organizing campaigns first from the outside
before attempting to gain adherents on the inside82 - if they have both-
ered to try to organize them at all.
A lot of the work of organizing Latinos was accomplished in safe,
familiar settings away from the workplace. Workers discussed their sit-
uations, and their desires to do something about them, in meetings held
in homes, churches, and social clubs consisting of immigrants who
maintained strong ties to their home state or village in Mexico or Central
America.83 In this respect, the workers' status as recent immigrants was
advantageous; outsiders in the community at large, they enjoyed the sol-
idarity of insiders in the mostly Hispanic communities along the Ala-
meda Corridor. They lived and worked together, and they sought out
familiar institutions to help them make the tough decisions and stick by
them. For example, a priest who lent his visible support to a union cam-
paign could not only reinforce an activist's resolve but also transform a
Catholic fence-sitter into a union adherent.84 And a patriarch or matri-
arch who lent his support, especially if s/he commanded respect in the
village back home in Mexico, could boost the solidarity behind a given
strike, boycott, or job action in the U.S.85 During the Pacific drywall
strike, union activists were aided by the fact that most of them hailed
from same handful of villages and towns in Mexico, where the strike
had gained support.86 When truckloads of striking drywall hangers
Id.
82. The contrast between bottom-up and top-down organizing is portrayed in the film Norma
Rae, in which the story of a successful drive to unionize a Southern textile mill begins with the
arrival of a professional organizer from the big city. He tries to court workers by passing out pro-
union literature at the factory gate. The effort is a miserable failure until local resident and mill
worker Norma Rae, an acquaintance, develops some interest, and later, a passion, for the union
cause. See NORMA RAE (Twentieth Century Fox 1979) (feature-length motion picture starring
Academy Award-winning actress Sally Field in title role).
83. See Organizing Effort, supra note 62, at 24.
84. See, e.g., MAP NOTES, July 1, 1995, at 1 (discussing role of Director of Hispanic
Ministries for Archdiocese of Los Angeles Father Pedro Villaroya, C.M., "in beginning to place
the LA MAP organization inside the Archdiocese of Los Angeles" and "generat[ing] a list of 55
Catholic parishes that are situated in the Alameda Corridor"). See also LA MAP, ORGANIZING THE
FUTURE, supra note 12, at 3 ("The ethnic composition and geographic concentration of the
targeted workforce means that the strategic involvement of community based organizations like
the Catholic Church and Mexican State Federations is crucial to a winning combination.").
85. Conversation with AFL-CIO California Immigrant Workers Association Organizer Joel
Ochoa (Mar. 1992). See also, e.g., Nancy Cleeland, Home for the Holidays, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 25,
1997, at A-3 (describing close familial, social, and financial ties between expatriate Mexicans
living in Santa Ana, Calif., and the permanent residents of Granjenal, Michoacan).
86. See Bacon, supra note 17.
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appeared at a targeted job site to exhort other men to walk off the job,
inevitably one or more of the workers would turn out to be an uncle,
cousin, or family friend of one of the strikers. Family and peer pressure
usually prevailed, and another job site would be shut down.87
Equally important to the success of these grass-roots efforts, how-
ever, was the involvement of official labor, but in a supporting rather
than a leading role. For example, the Machinists lent bilingual
organizers and business agents to the foundry workers' campaign at
American Racing; the Carpenters offered use of their union hall and the
advice of their legal counsel to the dry wall hangers' campaign in the
Pacific home building industry. During the "Justice for Janitors" cam-
paign at high-rise office buildings in Century City, the SEIU, one of the
few big unions with proven a track record of successfully organizing
low-wage workers of color, played a greater role in directing the con-
certed activities of custodians, but still depended on the initiative of the
thousands of marchers whose street rally brought business in normally
efficient Century City to a standstill. Later, the SEIU offered legal
assistance to workers who were arrested and in some cases injured by
police during the rally.
A case study of a successful drive to unionize Latinos at a Los
Angeles waterbed manufacturer illustrates why established labor organi-
zations, for all the technical and financial assistance that they provide,
still need the support of bottom-up efforts to succeed: on the one hand,
unless the workers see themselves as having a stake in the union, a
short-term organizing victory might turn into a long-term defeat at the
bargaining table; on the other hand, if workers lay their jobs on the line
only to find that union professionals don't care about what happens to
them, then they will feel betrayed. A professional organizer recalled a
meeting at which one of the shop's workers, a man respected by his
peers, asked him a number of questions on behalf of the group:
"Could we be fired?" I said, "Of course." "What will the union do
if they fire us?" I remember saying that the union would not do any-
thing for you or anyone if you're fired. [Instead, I asked:] What are you
going to do for yourself? How are we going to work together? First, we
have to identify who the union is. If we're going to identify the union as
this building or me, it's better that we don't do anything. You want to
organize the company. What are you going to do for him or him for you
if you're fired? What we can provide is a lawyer and the experience we
have on how to minimize the risk. If there is a firing, try to win it.
That's all [a union can do] .... "How are you going to guarantee that
you don't sell out?" They had to insure that some idiot like me didn't
87. Id.
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sell out. The best way was for them to take the reins of the campaign in
their own hands. They wanted me to promise that they would get certain
wages and benefits, but I said I couldn't promise it.88
In an age when so many other U.S. workers seem reluctant to
embrace unionism, it is remarkable that an historically outsider group of
working people have managed not only to choose collective representa-
tion, but also to achieve tangible progress with it.
2. IVORY TOWER EXPERTISE.
The professionals who lent their expertise to successful Latino
organizing campaigns included not only veteran labor organizers but
also academics who wanted to make a difference. In Southern Califor-
nia, much of the strategic groundwork that made it possible to finish the
job that Latino workers had started was laid by economics and urban
planning professors associated with UCLA's Community Scholars Pro-
gram. The Community Scholars, who were organized by Professor
Gilda Haas, were drawn from two institutions affiliated with UCLA: the
university's School of Urban Planning and its Center for Labor Research
and Education. 9
The Community Scholars undertook the research necessary to tar-
get particular industries for organizing. For example, a document enti-
tled Manufacturing in Los Angeles: Opportunities for Organizing,9"
published by LA MAP, attempted to make the case why organizing
Latino manufacturing workers in the Alameda Corridor was not only
feasible but also necessary to the community's economic health. The
twenty-four charts and graphs attached to the document were produced
by Professor Goetz Wolff. Professor Wolff's extensive research
showed, as noted above, that the region's manufacturing sector is thriv-
ing; that low-wage Latino labor produce its profits; and that by carefully
targeting certain types of businesses, especially in the non-durable goods
segment, unions could successfully organize their workers without driv-
ing the businesses away to other communities or other countries.
Among other things, Professor Wolff believed that certain types of
manufacturing businesses are extremely sensitive to their locations; that
88. HECTOR DELGADO, NEW IMMIGRANTS, OLD UNIONS: ORGANIZING UNDOCUMENTED
WORKERS IN Los ANGELES 37 (1993) (remarks of Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers
Union organizer Ndstor Rivas) (emphasis added) [hereinafter DELGADO, NEW IMMIGRANTS, OLD
UNIONS].
89. Prominent Community Scholars included UCLA School of Urban Planning Professors
Gilda Hass (the Community Scholars' coordinator) and Goetz Wolff and Center for Labor
Research and Education Executive Director Kent Wong. They also served on LA MAP's
advisory board. See LA MAP, ORGANIZING OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 41, at 30.
90. See LA MAP, ORGANIZING OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 41.
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is, they cannot easily pack up and move away to avoid a union without
jeopardizing their access to important markets for their manufactures.
He identified nearly 400,000 manufacturing jobs falling into eight clus-
ters of business types as being location-sensitive to Los Angeles County.
They included apparel and textiles (112,000 jobs); printing (50,700
jobs); trucking and warehousing (49,200 jobs); fabricated metal products
and auto parts (64,300 jobs); food and kindred products (43,000); furni-
ture and fixtures and lumber and wood products (32,900 jobs); miscella-
neous plastics products (24,000) jobs; and paper and allied products
(15,900 jobs).9 1
Professor's Wolff s research was quickly put to the test. During the
summer of 1996, Latino truck drivers went on strike against Gruma
Corp., a U.S. subsidiary of Mexican food giant Grupo Maseca, S.A., for
higher wages and more generous reimbursements of the expenses they
incurred while delivering Mission- and Guerrero-label tortillas to super-
markets and restaurants.92 The success of the strike, which involved
only 170 workers, depended on a community boycott of the company's
popular tortillas, which accounted for 60 percent of the huge Los Ange-
les market. 93 According to the executive director of LA MAP, the strat-
egy behind the boycott, based on Professor Wolff's research, was that
Gruma could afford neither to wait out a long boycott nor to import
tortillas from its facilities outside the region.94 Waiting out the boycott
could cause the company to lose market share to other local manufac-
tures; importing tortillas could alienate picky Southern California con-
sumers - especially Latinos - who demand that their tortillas be fresh.
The reason why Gruma had located its state-of-the-art tortilla plant in
East Los Angeles in the first place was to be able to deliver fresh torti-
llas to area consumers. 95 After seven weeks, the strike and the boycott
ended with a new contract providing substantial increases in drivers' pay
and benefits.
In sum, academics like Professor Wolff have played a key role in
Latinos's successful organizing efforts. Law professors would do well
to emulate their activism.
91. See LA MAP, ORGANIZING THE FUTURE, supra note 12 (attachment 1).
92. See Brooks, supra note 10, at D-10 (before the strike, Gruma Corp. reportedly paid the
typical truck driver $500, including commissions, for a 6-day work week against projected sales
of about $500 million for the year). Union officials complained that the pay was closer to $200 to
$300 per week. See Weikel, supra note 9, at B-1.
93. See id.
94. Conversation with LA MAP Project Coordinator Peter Olney (Aug. 1996).
95. See Brooks, supra note 10, at D-10 ("The East Los Angeles plant is the most
technologically advanced tortilla-making facility in the world, churning out over 15 million
tortillas a day.").
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3. HOME REMEDIES.
In the health-conscious 1990s, unconventional therapies for chronic
illnesses are gaining widespread acceptance, especially among urban,
educated, Anglo professionals.96 A path-breaking study published by
the New England Journal of Medicine in 1993 revealed that America's
commitment to unconventional forms of therapy is nearly as deep as it is
to conventional ones.97 The study estimated that 34 percent of all
United States residents use one or more of sixteen different forms of
alternative therapy each year.98 Tellingly, among patients using uncon-
ventional therapy in 1990, nearly two-thirds did not bother to visit an
alternative care provider.99 But the one-third who did made 425 million
visits to such care providers at total cost of $13.7 billion.' Of this sum
96. See David M. Eisenberg, Ronald C. Kessler, Cindy Foster, Frances E. Norlock, David R.
Calkins & Thomas L. Delbanco, Unconventional Medicine in the United States - Prevalence,
Costs, and Patterns of Use, 328 NEw ENG. J. MED. 246, 248 (1993) [hereinafter Eisenberg, et al.,
Unconventional Medicine]; see also, e.g., Daniel J. Hufford, Folk Medicine in Contemporary
America, in HERBAL AND MAGICAL MEDICINE: TRADITIONAL HEALING TODAY 18 (James
Kirkland, Holley F. Matthews, C.W. Sullivan III & Karen Baldwin eds., 1992) ("Patients on
unorthodox treatment [for cancer] ... tended to be white ... and better educated ... than patients
on conventional treatment.") (quoting Barrie Cassileth, et al., Contemporary Unorthodox
Treatments in Cancer Medicine: A Study of Patients, Treatments, and Practitioners, ANNALS OF
INTERNAL MED. 102, 105-12 (1984)).
97. Eisenberg, et al., Unconventional Medicine, supra note 96, at 246.
98. Id. at 248. These unconventional therapies were:
PERCENT USING IN
TYPE OF THERAPYt LAST 12 MONTHS
Relaxation techniques 13%
Chiropractic 10
Massage 7
Imagery 4
Spiritual healing 4
Commercial weight-loss programs 4
Lifestyle diets (e.g., macrobiotics) 4
Herbal medicine 3
Mega-vitamin therapy 2
Self-help groups 2
Energy healing I
Biofeedback I
Hypnosis I
Homeopathy I
Acupuncture <1
Folk remedies <1
t Other than exercise or prayer
Id. at 248.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 250; see also Terence Monmaney & Shari Roan, Hope or Hype?, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
30, 1998, at A-I (describing alternative medicine as "an $18 billion industry edging into the
mainstream, with California leading the way").
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about three quarters - $10.3 billion - was paid out of pocket. 01  By
contrast, the general public made 388 million visits to primary care phy-
sicians, and for the conventional hospitalizations ordered by those physi-
cians, paid $12.8 billion out of pocket. 10 2 Remarkably, patients tended
to seek out unconventional and conventional treatments together, usually
unbeknownst to their traditional primary care physicians.0 3
Of course, many Latino households have never given up the old
remedios caseros - home remedies - of our ancestors to cure the
common afflictions of human kind. The rich literature available today
on home remedies and how to use them owes much to Latino folk tradi-
tions, especially those of Mexican-Americans. 1°4
Why do unconventional therapies continue to flourish alongside the
conventional ones embraced by modern medical science? Often, it is
because the intervention of Western healing practices alone has failed.
"Many of us are searching for a cure, and we take it wherever we can get
it - and that is not entirely with traditional medicine," explained a
reader who had devoured the Journal's study.10 5
Like conventional medicine, conventional labor law often fails the
very patients that it is supposed to help. The debilitating "on the job"
injuries from which so many workers, especially Latinos, suffer - low
pay and anti-democratic working conditions - resist the twin conven-
tional cures that the American legal system offers: enacting new laws
and bringing legal actions. As suggested by both labor law scholars 106
101. Id.
102. Id. at 251.
103. Id. at 249, 250.
104. See, e.g., GUIA M8DICA DE REMEDIOS CASEROS (Prevention Magazine eds., 1995);
MICHAEL MOORE, Los REMEDIOS: TRADITIONAL HERBAL REMEDIES OF THE SOUTHWEST (2d ed.
1990); RooTs OF HEALING: THE NEW MEDICINE (Andrew Weil & Michael Toms eds.,1997);
ANNETrE SANDOVAL, HOMEGROWN HEALING: MEXICAN HOME REMEDIES (1998).
My great-grandmother, Refugio Presa ("Mama Cuca") Ruiz, learned many remedios caseros
in her hometown of Aguascalientes, in the Mexican state of the same name, and practiced them
while raising her family in Gardena, Calif. For a college project, my cousin Shannon Carr Davey
interviewed Mama Cuca and catalogued a number of her remedios caseros, including the use of
tomato poultices to cure migraine headaches. My grandfather, Frank X. Ruiz, suffered from
severe migraines. He recalled having endured Mama Cuca's treatments, but not having enjoyed
them. See Shannon Carr, Beliefs of Mama Cuca 3-4 (Spring 1985) (unpublished Folklore 241
term paper, El Camino College, Torrance, Calif.) (on file with author).
105. Letter to Editor from Diane Korte, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1141, 1200 (1993). To the
same effect were the sentiments of a reader of Consumer Reports, which in 1994 undertook its
own investigation of "homeopathic" medicine: "Homeopathy survives because it works and
people want it.... I do everything I can to avoid hospitals, chemicals, medicine, and surgery. I
see my allopath for medical tests; treatment, when necessary, comes from my licensed M.D.
homeopath. God save me from the butchers." Letter to Editor from Name Withheld, CONSUMER
REPORTS, June 1994, at 6.
106. See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 241-52 (1990) (critiquing merits
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and legal commentators, 0 7 the notion that workers' rights can be vindi-
cated primarily by resort to lawmaking and adjudication is belied by the
facts. In their book Failed Revolutions, °8 Richard Delgado and Jean
Stefancic have identified the source of such failures of law and legal
institutions as a defect not in our wills but in our imaginations: "the
array of preconceptions, meanings, and habits of mind that limit and
frame the horizon of our possibilities."10 9 Limitations of imagination
necessarily impose limitations on action, whether we are doctors or law-
yers, labor leaders or elected officials, legal scholars or society at large.
Organizing among Latino workers has been successful in part
because it has not been confined within the conventional limits of
labor's imagination. Three strategies have been particularly useful: (a)
undertaking large-scale organizing efforts, (b) pressuring employers
through non-traditional self-help tactics, and (c) steering clear of official
legal institutions, especially the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") and the law it administers, the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRB").
(a) Large-scale organizing efforts. Organizing is expensive, for
employers as well as unions. Facing the wage pressures that unioniza-
tion entails, most employers are understandably resistant to relinquish-
ing any competitive edge in labor costs to their competition by
becoming unionized and are willing to spend great effort now to avoid
having to spend more on wages and benefits later. 1 I Facing such resist-
ance, unions are understandably reluctant to commit scare resources to
difficult organizing campaigns. The result is piecemeal organizing.
Unions tend to organize on a "shop by shop" rather than on an "industry
by industry" basis, and to focus on so-called "hot shops" - places
where in-plant organizing is already underway - when they do make a
move.
Although shop-by-shop organizing has its place, too often it is inef-
fective compared to industry-wide organizing. Pacific drywall hangers
working in Southern California homebuilding and janitors embracing
the "Justice for Janitors" campaign were successful largely because they
gained adherents and demanded a place at the bargaining table by
of last, unsuccessful effort by Congress in 1978 to undertake comprehensive reform of National
Labor Relations Act).
107. See, e.g., THOMAS GEOHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE You ON? TRYING TO BE FOR LABOR
WHEN IT'S FLAT ON ITS BACK 163 (1991) (criticizing "post-strike America" as place where "the
rank-and-file stay home and send out their lawyers").
108. RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, FAILED REVOLUTIONS: SOCIAL REFORM AND THE
LIMITS OF THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1994).
109. Id. at xvi.
110. See WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE, supra note 106, at 108-14, 238-41.
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attacking all employers in the target industry at once. When an entire
industry can be shut down, employers take notice. As LA MAP strate-
gists put it:
Los Angeles can serve as a successful proving ground of the labor
movement's ability to organize whole industries, geographic areas and
communities at once. Single shop by shop organizing does not generate
the energy and excitement necessary to create the momentum needed to
make the labor movement the instrument it can become in the lives of
workers and their families. This kind of "scale" organizing is necessary
111
In this respect, labor is returning to its roots; industry-wide bargain-
ing is the paradigm attached to traditional federal labor law, especially in
the years after World War II. Once an entire industry (or at least, a
critical mass of it) is organized, labor costs for each employer in the
industry can be equalized. Theoretically, no single employer need com-
pete for the consumer's dollar based on the cost of labor once each
employer must pay the same price for it."I2
The main problem with this paradigm is that industrial unionism is
dead or dying in industries that are global in nature." I 3 As physical and
cultural barriers to the movement of capital have fallen, the potential
labor markets of many industries have grown. In these industries, the
labor pool now includes low-wage, non-union workers abroad. Many of
these workers are desperate for any work at any wage. Unless these
workers are successfully organized, and unless their wages are substan-
tially raised, even successful large-scale organizing of workers unions in
discrete parts of the U.S. economy could be for naught.
(b) Non-strike alternatives. Traditionally, workers dissatisfied with
terms and conditions of employment imposed by an employer resorted
to their economic weapons of self-help, especially the strike and the
picket line. But the harsh realities imposed by the global marketplace
for wage labor in so many industries today means that neither the strike
nor the picket line poses the economic threat it to employers that it used
to. 1 14 More than ever, these are weapons of last, and sometimes futile,
resort. Alternative self-help tactics, however, have been developed, and
I 11. LA MAP, ORGANIZING THE FUTURE, supra note 12, at 2-3.
112. See, e.g., Cameron, Wages of Syntax, supra note 64, at 990.
113. See, e.g., Michael Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for
Unorganized Workers, in FINKIN, supra note 4, at 62-63.
114. See, e.g., Michael Bologna, Unions Pursuing Nontraditional Strategies for Leveraging
Labor Peace with Employers, 1998 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 3, at D-13 (Jan. 6, 1998)
(remarks of AFL-CIO Department of Corporate Affairs Director Ron Blackwell); Academics,
Union Leaders Examine Union Strikes, Contract Campaign Strategies, 1997 DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) No. 9, at D-13 (Jan. 14, 1997) (remarks of Frank Borgers, labor researcher, University of
Alabama, Birmingham).
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labor's experimentation with them over the past ten to fifteen years has
been promising.
For some time, unions have successfully undertaken a variety of
"campaigns" designed "to challenge management in the workplace, in
the community, in the board room, and on Wall Street." 1 '5 In a corpo-
rate campaign, consumers may be urged to boycott the employer's prod-
ucts and take other actions aimed at influencing corporate shareholders;
sometimes, union members buy stock in a company solely for the pur-
pose of gaining a forum at shareholders' meetings. In a community
campaign, members of churches and temples, civic organizations, and
other community groups may be urged to contact the employer to
express their concern about its labor relations policies and to participate
in rallies and other public events designed to draw unfavorable attention
to the employer's behavior. And in a traditional advertising campaign,
members of the public at large may be urged to see things the union's
way through radio and television spots.
For example, Teamster delivery drivers at Gruma Corp. used vari-
ants of both the corporate and community campaigns - the former, by
appealing to consumers to boycott Mission- and Guerrero-label torti-
llas;' 16 the latter, by recruiting and deploying a group of UCLA students
to go into the Hispanic communities of East and South Central Los
Angeles to build support for the boycott.1"7
Moreover, taking a cue from members of academy, some unions
are reaching across borders to build solidarity abroad for labor disputes
having effects at home. For example, at the New Otani Hotel in Los
Angeles' Little Tokyo, officials of the Hotel Employees and Restaurant
Employees Union traveled to Japan to rally support among Japanese
labor leaders and demonstrate against Kajima Corp., the hotel's
owner."18 It was a small step, but an important one. As long-time Cali-
fornia labor leader Jack Henning put it: "The only answer to global capi-
talism is global unionism."119
(c) Avoiding official legal institutions. Latino workers have over-
come tremendous legal obstacles to form and join their unions. The
115. Bologna, supra note 114, at D-13.
116. See, e.g., L.A. Organizing Project Gets Funding from Teamsters, 1996 DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) No. 190, at D-11 (Oct. 1, 1996) (remarks of LA MAP Project Coordinator Peter Olney).
117. Conversation with LA MAP Project Coordinator Peter Olney (Aug. 1996).
118. See Toshio Aritake, Sweeney Says New Otani Officials in Japan Did Not Engage in
Serious Talks on Dispute, 1997 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 69, at D-16 (Apr. 10, 1997); Toshio
Aritake, Japanese Labor Group Says Dispute at Los Angeles Hotel "Tough to Settle," 1997 DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 41, at D-14 (Mar. 3, 1997).
119. Joyce Cutler, Panelists Say Workers Need to Form Alliances to Prevent Erosion of
Wages, 1996 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 227, at D-14 (Nov. 25, 1996) (remarks of former
California AFL-CIO Executive Secretary Jack Henning).
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built-in shortcomings of federal labor law in the late Twentieth Century
have been well-documented; it hardly needs to be pointed out again that
the structure of the National Labor Relations Act itself often stands in
the way of the effective enforcement of the very employees' rights that
the law is supposed to protect.1 20 Moreover, up to half of Latino work-
ers are recent immigrants; it is no secret that the entry, residency, and
citizenship requirements of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, not
to mention their unforgiving application, place high hurdles between
Latinos and the jobs they seek to gain and maintain in the United
States.1 21  Whether documented or undocumented, the choice by so
many Latino workers to take up union activism defies the conventional
wisdom that immigrants tend to avoid getting involved in workplace or
community affairs for fear of deportation, calling unwanted attention to
themselves, or both.122
Instead, what these workers avoided was getting involved in the
government bureaucracies that administer federal labor and immigration
law. As to labor law, organizers of Latino workers consciously pre-
ferred to place their hopes in self-help tactics rather than in the NLRB.
LA MAP made this "non-NLRB" strategy an explicit organizing princi-
ple.' 2 3 As to immigration law, there is little organizers could do to influ-
ence the policies and enforcement practices of the Immigration
Naturalization Service. But they could recognize that, despite the formi-
dable barriers posed by the statute and the INS, Latino workers inevita-
bly come to the U.S. and find work here.' 24 The very fact that Latino
immigrants come in spite of everything done through legal institutions
to deter them from doing so suggests the strongest desire to improve
their own lives, and the potential for doing so without official govern-
ment assistance.
120. See, e.g., Christopher D. Cameron, Why Labor Unions Are Failing, J. COMM., Aug. 10,
1992, at 8.
121. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations:
A "Magic Mirror" into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1136-40 (1998) (contrasting
simultaneous U.S. policies favoring importation of low-wage Mexican labor under Bracero
Program and expulsion of same under Operation Wetback).
122. For an explanation why the lack of documents did not significantly interfere with an
organizing drive among a largely undocumented Latino workforce at a waterbed factory in Los
Angeles, see DELGADO, NEW IMMIGRANTS, OLD UNIONS, supra note 88, at 8-9, 57-99.
123. See LA MAP, ORGANIZING THE FUTURE, supra note 12, at 3; accord Cooper, Labor Deals,
supra note 77, at 12 (remarks of Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 226 Secretary-Treasurer
John Wilhelm) (The success of Las Vegas organizing drives is "proof that you do not have to go
through the useless N.L.R.B. mess to come out with a victory.").
124. For a discussion of the familial and social networks that give many immigrant Latinos a
leg up in finding jobs, see Abigail Goldman, A Hidden Advantage for Some Job Seekers, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 1997, at A-1 (contrasting successful job search of immigrant Mexican Pablo
Cifuntas with unsuccessful job search of native-born African-American Flossie Bradford).
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1II. SOME CHALLENGES FACING A LATINO-LED LABOR MOVEMENT
For everything promising that I have mentioned about organizing
among Latinos, there is much that is unsettling. At least three serious
challenges confront the labor movement in general and a Latino-led
labor movement in particular.
First, the arduous task of labor organizing has a long, long way to
go before it is in a position to help even half of the low-wage workforce,
whether in Los Angeles County or across the United States, whether
Latino or otherwise. At barely 10 percent of the private sector non-
agricultural workforce, the labor movement remains on the margins of
the working lives of most Americans and is likely to remain so for some
time to come. Although the AFL-CIO and its affiliated unions have
made real progress under John Sweeney, "the road ahead remains unsure
and bumpy. And the residual weight of decades past makes the ultimate
success of Sweeney's project anything but certain."' 25
Indeed, there are already significant casualties. Only a few years
after it started, LA MAP is all but dead, mortally wounded by the inabil-
ity of disparate Southern California unions to put aside their parochial
interests in order to pursue the broader organizing agenda conceived by
its framers.' 26 So notwithstanding the contributions of Latino organiz-
ing successes, labor's first, and perhaps overwhelming, challenge will be
merely to sustain the modest momentum it has achieved during the
1990s.
Second, to be truly successful, labor has to be inclusive; that is, it
must build coalitions among all workers, not just Latinos (and for that
matter, not just workers living in the U.S.). As Professor Rudy Acufia
and others have noted, even in Los Angeles County, the longstanding
tensions between Latinos and Anglos are now supplemented by poten-
tially greater tensions between and among Asians, Blacks and Lati-
nos. "'27 These tensions show up in many places, including the struggle
by poor people for decent jobs at decent wages. Indeed, one of the
greatest challenges facing communities of color, including Latino com-
munities, is how to achieve "interracial justice" in an era when their
growing influence causes other such communities of color to feel dis-
placed. 2 ' A Latino-led labor movement that improves the lives of
125. See Cooper, Labor's Hardest Drive, supra note 77, at 16.
126. See Silverstein, Undaunted, supra note 14, at A-I, A-24 ("Last year, [LA MAP] drew
notice with its bold proposal to link a coalition of unions in a campaign to organize the hundreds
of thousands of immigrant workers in the area along the Alameda Corridor .... When it came
time to kick in money, though, most of the support fell apart.").
127. See ACURA, ANYTHING BUT MEXICAN, supra note 52, at 127-33, 149-54.
128. See, e.g., Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering
in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821 (1997) (discussing suit by Chinese Americans
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Latino workers at the expense of, or at the perceived expense of, other
"others," is doomed to suffer the same insularity that the Anglo-led labor
movement has.
Finally, labor's toughest challenge is not organizing workers, but
rather, organizing a new vision of social justice. Once labor recruits all
the new members it now plans to get, what is it going to do with
them? 12 9 The tension is age-old. During the Nineteenth Century, organ-
ized labor saw itself as a means toward the end of civic republicanism,
and for a time, the end of capitalism itself; during the Twentieth Cen-
tury, it saw itself as means toward "business unionism," working in part-
nership with the owners of capital. 130 It remains to be seen whether,
during the Twenty-first Century, labor will be about more than the pur-
suit of bigger paychecks and better benefits. As one observer has put it:
"Are you organizing workers to empower themselves and confront
employers or just building dues-paying units and looking for a seat at
the table?"' 13 1
Even the brightest lights in the labor movement don't yet know.
"It's too early to devise a strategy," explains SEIU President Andy
Stern. "First you've got to get people into the boat and get them rowing.
We still don't have the hundreds of organizers we need going out every
night; still don't have our pension plans where they should be; still don't
have enough experience in winning strikes with community support." 132
But if the beginning of a new era is too soon to develop a new
vision of social justice, when will it be? If the heyday of Cesar Chavez
and the United Farm Workers is any indication, there is some reason to
believe many people at the core of labor's new movement, especially
Latino workers, hunger for more than business unionism; they also want
justice, morality, and spirituality. 133 It would seem that the time to dis-
to invalidate San Francisco court-ordered school desegregation program won by NAACP); Eric K.
Yamamoto, Conflict and Complicity: Justice Among Communities of Color, 2 HARV.-LAT. L.
REV. 495 (1997) (discussing same and suit by Latino and Asian groups to invalidate Oakland
affirmative action program favored by Black contractors). See also George A. Martinez, African-
Americans, Latinos, and the Construction of Race: Toward an Epistemic Coalition, 19 CHICANO-
LAT. L. REV. 213, 215 (1998) (advocating that Mexican-Americans build coalitions with other
people of color by rejecting their official legal designation as White).
129. See Cooper, Labor's Hardest Drive, supra note 77, at 18.
130. See, e.g., Christopher D. Cameron, How the "Language of the Law" Limited the
American Labor Movement, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141, 1147 (1992) (book review) (identifying
the goals of "business unionism" as "'deliver[ing] the goods' at the workplace level by providing
higher wages and benefits to workers as well as a voice for them at the bargaining table and on the
shop floor") (citations omitted).
131. See Cooper, Labor's Hardest Drive, supra note 77, at 18.
132. Id. (remarks of Service Employees International Union President Andy Stem).
133. See generally, e.g., PETER MATTHIESSEN, SAL SI PUEDES: CESAR CHAVEZ AND THE NEW
AMERICAN REVOLUTION UNION (1969).
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cuss organized labor's role, if any, in pursuing these goals is now.
CONCLUSION
I began this essay by discussing the significance of the UPS strike
during the summer of 1997 for Latino workers. For me, this dispute
signaled the great potential of the new American labor movement, and
with it, the important role that Latino workers are destined to play. Like
the other great organizing victories of the 1990s, the UPS strike demon-
strated not only that Latino workers have much to gain from the labor
movement, but also that the labor movement has much to gain from
Latino workers. Octavio Paz says that modem man "never surrenders
himself to what he is doing," and that "the profoundest part" of him
"always remains detached and alert." '13 4 As a law professor who has the
luxury of examining "the profoundest part" of women and men at work,
I am finding that there is no better place to study the interdependence of
Latino workers and the labor movement than Los Angeles, where exper-
iments in the future are being conducted every day.
134. PAZ, supra note 1, at 204.
1999] 1117
